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ABSTRACT 
This paper explores discourses of automation as a key ethical concern in the 
development of Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems for disaster response. We 
discuss problems arising from ‘humanistic’ dichotomies that pit human against 
machine, military against civil uses and experts against laypersons. We explore 
how it may be possible to overcome human-technology dichotomies. 
Keywords 
Automation, drones, responsibility, RPAS, posthuman phenomenology. 
INTRODUCTION  
Aerial drones, which as weapon systems have almost iconically represented the 
war on terror, are facing increasing demand in many civil (and commercial) 
domains, among them unsurprisingly emergency response. In response to this 
trend, regulatory bodies like the EU Commission have been stressing the need for 
the development of a common (EU wide) regulatory framework – integrated into 
harmonised European Air Space regulations (EU Commission, 2014a). A key 
motivation is to provide the legal certainty necessary for encouraging investment 
by European enterprises in this up and coming market. At the same time, EU 
policy makers seem to identify apprehension on the part of the citizens, which 
needs to be addressed through strict regulations. Among the sought for regulatory 
re-assurances is one that stipulates that piloting will not be automated. The 
reasoning that underpins this decision as well as the ‘renaming’ of ‘Unmanned 
Aerial Vehicles’ (UAV) or ‘drones’ as ‘Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems’ 
(RPAS) are problematic. They reflect attempts at “humanising” technology by 
positing complete human control and framing issues of responsibility within a 
dichotomy of technology vs. human. The problem with this is that it disregards the 
fact that the human and the technical augment each other in ways that distribute 
agency and responsibilities within a socio-technical assemblage. For example, 
there are many processes and practices which need to be automated in order to be 
safe when flying RPAS.  
Drawing on experiences of addressing ethical, legal and social issues (ELSI) 
through collaborative design in the Bridge and SecInCoRe projects – two 
interdisciplinary projects concerned with the design of new technologies for 
multi-agency and cross-border disaster response and managementi - we seek to 
overcome human-technology dichotomies. Exploring the phenomenology or 
different modes of embodying human-drone agency assemblages, this paper 
introduces notions of post-human, relational ethics and distributed responsibilities 
and sounds out what this might mean for ethical and societal implications in 
innovation and design projects, as well as efforts of regulating RPAS. 
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ECONOMIC INCENTIVES AND REGULATORY ISSUES 
A European Summit in 2013 called for action that would enable the progressive 
integration of civil RPAS into civil airspace from 2016 onwards (EU 
Commission, 2014a). Identifying ‘A new era for aviation’, the EU is seeking to 
respond to calls from the service and manufacturing industry to remove regulatory 
barriers, harmonise the relevant operational rules and develop a common 
regulatory and policy framework in order to provide the legal certainty necessary 
for investment by European enterprises. Beyond their much talked about military 
use, RPAS technologies have been progressively maturing and are already used in 
some civil and commercial settings such as environmental monitoring, security, 
emergency response, surveillance and recreation.ii Yet, it is their potential to offer 
new services, novel applications and consequently further economic growth 
opportunities that has captured the European Commission's attention. Likened to 
the internet technologies of the early nineties, the promise is that RPAS 
technologies can offer ‘a myriad new services’ - from infrastructure monitoring 
and photography to the transport of goods and, in the long term, even people - 
along with a real opportunity to foster job creation and a source for innovation and 
economic growth. Emergency response is a highly significant domain in this, 
where innovations could be developed rapidly and emphasise benign potential. 
Yet along with opportunities come also challenges. The lack of a unified 
regulatory framework means that special authorisations are issued through 
burdensome procedures on a case by case basis by each member state in order to 
allow providers and manufacturers to operate. This stifles market development 
and innovation. As the EU report stresses, ensuring a safe and harmonised 
regulatory framework is in the interests of both the service and manufacturing 
industry who may delay investment until clear and comprehensive legal 
frameworks are in place, but also the public who are identified as having serious 
concerns over issues such as safety, security and privacy. To address these issues, 
the EU Commission calls for  
• Strict	  EU	  wide	  rules	  on	  safety	  authorisations.	  	  
• Tough	  controls	  on	  privacy	  and	  data	  protection.	  	  
• Controls	  to	  ensure	  security.	  	  
• A	  clear	  framework	  for	  liability	  and	  insurance.	  	  
• Streamlining	  R&D	  &	  supporting	  new	  industry.	  (EU	  Commission,	  2014b)	  
Through such actions, the European Commission aims not only to establish a 
single, European RPAS market to ‘reap the societal benefits of this innovative 
technology’ but also to ensure that societal concerns on issues, such as safety, 
privacy and security, will be addressed through ‘adequate public debate’ (EU 
Commission, 2014a: 4).  
Demilitarising and Humanising a Risky Technology 
And let me be clear on one point. We are talking here about machines 
which will be under human control, not completely automatic. Somebody, 
somewhere will always have his or her hand on the joystick (Siim Kallas in 
EU Commission, 2014c) 
This is a point EU Vice-President Siim Kallas stressed in his press statement in 
April 2014. The attention to automation is driven by a perceived need to manage 
public acceptance, where - alongside fears about privacy intrusion - fears over 
safety in general and automation in particular have been identified as one of the 
key obstacles faced by the civil-RPAS market. The EU Vice-President is keen to 
address these fears head on. Arguing that the public view RPAS as ‘killing 
machines’ informed by military uses and ‘catastrophe movies’, the Roadmap 
produced by the European RPAS Steering Group (ERSG, 2013b: 30) recommends 
that such perceptions must be replaced by alternative visions. The Roadmap 
proposes the solution: ‘Give to the citizens a different vision’ (ibid: 36). Although 
the document does not outline specific strategies on how to achieve this, it hints at 
ways of directing the debate to particular avenues - such as towards visions of 
machines taking care of, what could be called, the “dangerous, dull, and dirty” iii 
jobs of oil rig maintenance or the hard grind of search and rescue. As the report 
recommends, the civil RPAS community should ‘stress the roles RPAS have in 
conducting humanitarian operations or in testing for airborne toxins, rather than 
focusing only on the military and security applications’ (ERSG 2013b:  39–40). 
This battle of perceptions seems to be one of the key headaches that both industry 
and policymakers face at the moment and, as Boucher (2014) writes, it is part of a 
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general attempt to ‘demilitarise’ the drone starting from the name itself. In his 
article titled ‘Don’t say ‘Drones’, beg Drone Makers’, Whittle (2013) writes that 
‘AUVSI [Aerial Unmanned Vehicle Systems International], the Air Force, the 
Navy, the Army and many defense industry leaders just hate the word “drones”’. 
There are reports of keynote speakers being advised not to use the ‘“D” word’ in a 
drone and aerial robotics conference (Gosztola, 2013), and of industry experts 
pleading (unsuccessfully) to journalists ‘Whatever you write, please don’t call it a 
drone. It just strikes fear into a lot of people’ (CEO of Scion UAS, Steen 
Mogensen in Terris, 2013).  
In a UK article in The Guardian newspaper, the British Secretary of State for 
Defence, Philip Hammond (2013) wrote:  
The most basic falsehood, invariably, is the use of the term “drone” – a 
name that conjures up images of computer-controlled machines, free from 
human oversight. It is a legitimate term in the right context but mostly it is 
used erroneously.  
Whether it is unreasonable fear and concern or a disingenuous PR strategy 
perpetuated by erroneous ‘“drone” activists’, as the Secretary of State would have 
it (Hammond, 2013), it is particularly interesting that public acceptance is played 
out on images of autonomous machines getting out of human control. As Langdon 
Winner (1977) has demonstrated, the fear of autonomy and of uncontrollable, 
intelligent machines has long pervaded our technological and political imaginaries 
manifesting itself as the anxiety of losing control over our smart helpers who 
might learn and adapt to such a degree that they end up outsmarting us. Such fears 
of ultimately losing sight of who is the master and who is the slave have their 
basis on the humanistic belief of the exceptionality and mastery of the human 
against its Others, be they slaves, servants, or, in this case, machines designed to 
do our bidding.iv  
Once again in the case of the drone, we see this fear being highlighted, repeated 
and in a way (per)formed in its very denial; namely, in the very efforts of good-
willed policymakers and experts who seek to reassure us that, really, there is 
nothing to worry about, either because we kind of got it all wrong - as AUVSI’s 
president, Michael Toscano is reported saying ‘the average person on the street, 
and even intelligent and informed people, when they think of the word ‘drone,’ 
they think of the military, they think hostile, they think weaponised, they think 
large and they think autonomous. That connotation is not only inaccurate but 
damaging’ (in Whittle, 2013; italics added) - or, because they will make sure that 
things don’t get out of control - promises by the EU Commission of ‘tough 
controls’ and ‘strict rules’ function as reassurances that there will always be 
‘human oversight’ or, as the EU Vice-President asserted in his earlier statement, 
there will always be somebody, somewhere with his or her hand on the joystick 
(in EU Commission, 2014c). Yet, as we will see, reality refuses to fit into such 
neat, paternalistic storylines. Human oversight is neither complete nor totally 
absent in RPAS in use. 
Complexity – Beyond Human Control (Autonomy and Automation) 
Underneath efforts to reassure what is perceived as an alarmed public with images 
of ‘somebody, somewhere’ always keeping a tight hold of the reigns, things are 
rather more complicated. While we do not have the space to explore the 
interlinked and often contradictory ways in which the concepts of autonomy and 
automation have developed through time,v we would like to make some 
preliminary but important observations which paint a more complicated picture; a 
picture which does not fit into humanistic stories of heroic humans, evil machines, 
and publics in distress.  
Autonomy, Automation and Control 
As the ERSG Roadmap report makes clear, automation and human control do not 
work against each other in the case of RPAS, but in synch, with a remote pilot in 
command under normal conditions, while automation is expected to take control 
in specific non-normal failure conditions, hence forming a complex, interlinked 
assemblage (ESRG, 2013a).  
This has always been the case in modern aviation according to Holloway, Knight 
and McDermid  (2014: 1) who write that, ‘[t]he notion of “autonomy” is neither 
absolute nor new in aviation’ and point us to the direction of the Full Authority 
Digital Engine Controllers (FADECs) which control modern aircraft engines. As 
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the authors demonstrate, there are different degrees of automation for different 
systems and in different situations with different results which do not easily lend 
themselves to a ‘simplistic view’ of automation as good or bad (2).  
Furthermore, as military experts stress, ‘there is nothing unmanned about an 
unmanned system’ (Michael Toscano, CEO of AUVSI, in Gosztola, 2013). In her 
testimony before a Senate subcommittee the former chief of AFRICOM (the US 
Combatant Command which covers Africa and Egypt) Martha McSally stated that  
the military does use the term “remotely piloted aircraft” to explain …  
that it actually takes 200 individuals to keep one of these aircrafts airborne 
for a 24 hour orbit and that 200 individuals include the operators, the 
intelligence personnel, the maintenance personnel, the equipment people, 
the lawyers, and, also, part of the process you have literally hundreds of 
other personnel that are involved in the process on the military side when 
you are actually conducting one of these operations (in Gosztola, 2013).  
While this does indeed confirm that there is always “a human in the loop”, we 
would argue that it does not in any way resolve the issue - as the military experts 
would have it - but actually opens the debate to further questions. Especially 
questions such as, when there is such a distribution of responsibility, who/what 
could, or should, take the blame when things go wrong?  
Drones as Dual-Use Technologies 
While drone advocates would like to break the link between drones and the 
military in the public’s minds, this link is actually strong. By tracing the 
‘enthusiasm’, as Boucher (2014) calls it, for the dual-use aspect of civil-RPAS 
development through the policy documents of the EU Commission’s consultation 
process, the author demonstrates that there is a strong interdependence between 
the military and civil RPAS industries as the latter is expected to drive innovation 
and ‘effectively amortise the high costs of development’ in the military sector (EU 
Commission, 2009 in Boucher, 2014).  
Under this light, the EU Commission’s strategies for promoting public acceptance 
which are based on diverting attention from such links can appear ‘disingenuous’, 
as Boucher (2014) puts it, and can undermine efforts for a responsible and 
transparent innovation process. This becomes particularly pertinent if we consider 
that the EU Commission is operating under the framework of Responsible 
Research and Innovation (RRI) for the technology development and management 
in Europe. This is a framework which permeates the Commission’s €80b 2014–
2020 research funding framework, Horizon 2020, and emerged from the 
Commission’s determination to bridge the gap between the scientific community 
and European citizens (EU Commission 2012).  
Multiple Public(s) 
The public is not the univocal (fearful, misinformed) entity that policymakers and 
drone experts imagine. There are cases of drone enthusiasts, of communities using 
drones in humanitarian emergency settings (e.g. Meier, 2014a, b) but also a 
limited number of studies that reveal a much more complicated and nuanced 
picture of the public which is not captured in media-hyped discourses (e.g. 
Eyerman, Letterman, Pitts, Holloway, Hinkle, Schanzer, Ladd, Mitchell, Kaydos-
Daniels, 2013).  
DISCUSSION: CHANGING THE STORIES 
Haraway warns that there is no way out of stories. ‘We exist in a sea of powerful 
stories’ (1997: 45) that weave the material, technical, social, political and textual 
together. Yet she asserts that changing the technoscientific stories that surround 
us, both materially and semiotically, is a modest intervention worth making (ibid). 
In this paper we have attempted to give a taste of some of the powerful stories that 
surround the figure of the drone in order to create and open the possibility of re-
telling them, of telling them differently as a way of intervention (Suchman, 2007).  
Specifically, we argue that humanist dualisms that pitch human vs. machine, 
expert vs. layman, military vs. civilian, heroic vs. evil veil important complexities 
of modern technoscience and posthuman phenomenology. Instead, we need to 
move away from traditional conceptions of agency as an inherent property of 
individual, discreet, self-standing entities (humans and machines) and 
reconceptualise it as the effect of particular human-machine configurations (see 
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Barad, 2007). In Suchman and Weber’s words, we need to ‘refigure autonomous 
agency’ (2014: 19) and, consequently, ethics and accountability in ways that can 
help us understand, account for and design around the complexities of our world. 
By challenging paternalistic stories of heroic humans, evil machines and publics 
in distress, we seek to open up the possibility of imagining, designing and doing 
socio-technical innovation in “responsible and accountable” ways; that is, ways 
which recognise that, as Scuppli puts it, neither humans nor machines operate in 
autonomous realms. Indeed, ‘complex systems are rarely, if ever, the product of 
single authorship’ (2014: 5). Instead, as we have learned from our own experience 
in addressing ethical, legal and social issues (ELSI) through collaborative design 
in the Bridge and SecInCoRe projects, complex socio-technical innovation is the 
outcome of an ongoing and deeply political process of negotiation, exploration 
and tinkering, which needs to be done in situ and hand in hand with humans and 
machines, publics and experts, stories and materials as they are all entangled in 
dynamic, yet asymmetric, assemblages.      
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i Bridge project: http://www.bridgeproject.eu/en, SecInCoRe 
project: http://www.secincore.eu. 
ii See, for example, Adams, Levitan and Friedland  (2012), de Cubber, Balta, 
Doroftei and Baudoin (2014), or projects like ConservationDrones.org, a non-
profit organization which seeks to build and use drones for conservation-related 
uses, and online communities such as DIYDrones.com, which focuses on DIY, 
recreational drone projects.  
iii As Suchman writes in her blog Robot Futures, this is an oft-repeated triple used 
to describe those forms of labour which are considered a priority for automation, 
and argues: ‘Assumed to be jobs that no human would want, this valuation makes 
absent the fact that these are the only jobs that, worldwide, increasing numbers of 
people rely upon to survive’ (2014). Also, see Suchman (2015: 15-17) where the 
author uses the case of the iRobot company to demonstrate how mottos like these 
are used to construct robotic imaginaries which bring together narratives of 
military war fighting alongside narratives of civilian domestic life.   
iv See Chasin (1995), Suchman (2007), Wise (1998). 
v Suchman and Weber (2014) trace the genealogy of the concept of autonomy 
within the philosophical traditions that inform AI, robotics and contemporary 
autonomous weapon systems. In their account, the authors explore the 
intermingled and often contradictory imaginaries that accompany autonomous 
machines. As they write ‘In the debate on autonomous weapon systems, it 
becomes even more obvious how autonomy is configured as self-sufficient, 
adaptive and self-determined performance on the one hand, and pre-programmed, 
fully automated execution under perfect human control on the other. These two 
imaginaries are profoundly intermingled, with questionable rhetorical and 
practical effects’ (14).    
